We study a model of dynamic two-stage R&D competition where the competing firms are uncertain about the difficulty of the first stage. Staying in the competition is costly and a firm can also choose whether and when to quit. When a firm solves the first stage, it can choose whether and when to disclose the solution. We find that there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, in which each firm will disclose the solution of the first stage if it arrives early, withhold the solution if it arrives neither too soon nor too late, and exit the competition if it has not arrived after a sufficiently long time. From a social welfare perspective, a competition is surprisingly not always optimal: in certain scenarios, it is socially more desirable to assign the R&D project to a single firm.
Introduction
In a multi-stage R&D process, uncertainty is a prominent feature of early but important stages. For instance, to build a revolutionary fighter jet, the manufacturing firm's research team has to first develop a new supersonic-speed engine, whose success likelihood as well as time and resource needed are often unknown.
This uncertainty has to be resolved via learning over time: if the firm has spent a long time in vain on a stage, it comes to realize that this stage is probably hard, even unfeasible; on the contrary, when it solves a stage quickly it knows that the stage is solvable and most likely to be easy. When more than one firm competes for such a multi-stage R&D project, interesting questions arise regarding the firms' strategic behavior. First, staying in the research process is costly in terms of time and resource that can be otherwise spent elsewhere for profits.
In view of this, when should a firm quit the competition? Second, when a firm solves an early stage it faces the choice of whether to disclose its findings (by filing a patent, for instance). Doing so secures the relevant economic value for the firm if its competitors have not yet also completed the stage, but may also result in technological spillover so that all competitors can work on the next stage now and the firm loses its leading position in the race. On the other hand, keeping the solution private gives the firm the advantage of working on the next stage alone, but puts the payoff from the prior stage at risk because some competitor may just work it out soon enough and claim a fair share. How then, should a firm decide when to disclose a solution (or not)?
In this paper, we propose a first model to comprehensively analyze firms' strategic decisions in a dynamic R&D competition under uncertainty, and to answer the above questions. We consider two firms competing on a continuous time line for a research project consisting of two stages, the first being an innovative stage to develop an intermediate product and the second a commercial stage to release a final product. The solution to the first stage is required for working on the second.
The success on each stage arrives in a Poisson rate, which is fixed for the second stage, but is uncertain for the first stage: it is either positive (feasible) or zero (unfeasible). Whenever a firm solves a stage, it can either disclose or withhold the solution. Disclosure entails technology spillover so that both firms can start working on the next stage. Each stage has its own value, which is wholly captured by the firm which discloses the solution if its opponent has not solved it yet, and is equally shared if both firms have the solution by the time either firm discloses it. Last but not least, there is a constant research cost per unit time to work on the first stage, while a firm is free to exit the competition once and for all at any moment.
We first characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this game, which always has a "disclose-withhold-exit" pattern. There are two important time thresholds: a firm will disclose the solution to the first stage if it succeeds (in the first stage) by the first threshold, withhold the solution if it succeeds between the thresholds, and exit if it has not succeeded by the second threshold. This result stands in contrast to the general claim in existing literature (e.g. Choi [6] , De Fraja [9] , Bloch and Markowitz [4] ) that the success of one firm in the intermediate product always benefits the rival as well, through either information update or technology spillover. We show that the invention of the intermediate product will never affect the rival's payoff or incentive in a late period of the competition, as long as the firms are naturally allowed to conceal their success and to exit the competition at will.
The reasoning behind our result is a firm's learning dynamics. When a firm has stayed in the competition long enough but has not received any good news from either itself or the opponent, it had better quit because information update implies that the first stage is likely to be unfeasible. In view of this, if a firm solves the first stage at a time close to the exit point, it will withhold the solution in the hope that the opponent will exit soon enough. Nevertheless, if the solution comes early there is not much benefit in withholding it and waiting, so the firm will just disclose the solution to guarantee the one bird in hand.
Secondly, we turn to the welfare perspective and find that in contrast to the conventional wisdom, a competition is not always desirable under uncertainty.
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In particular, we show that when the first stage is likely to be solvable and the research cost is high, the ex ante probability of completing the whole research project is higher when only one firm works on it than when two firms compete.
The underlying intuition is that during a competition in such a scenario, the fear of lagging in stage 1 will ultimately outweigh the fear of stage 1 being unsolvable, causing the firms to exit prematurely compared to the case of a single firm. As a further implication on policy, if the success of a R&D project is crucial but the success likelihood is uncertain, the relevant authorities (the Ministry of Defense, for instance) should carefully assess both the distribution of the success likelihood and the associated cost, and may consider assigning the research task to one firm privately rather than tendering it to multiple competing firms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 states the main results with illustrative examples. Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review
Early economic models of R&D races explore the investment decisions that firms make in an effort to reduce production cost [7, 8] , obtain a rewarding technological breakthrough [17] , or secure intellectual property rights [15, 13] . Among these seminal works, Loury [15] proposes the framework with exponentially distributed time to innovation success, which has become one of the standard ways to depict a R&D competition in subsequent research. We adopt this approach in our model with an added structure of uncertainty. While the early works usually emphasize a firm's optimal investment problem in a one-shot game, we focus our attention on the optimal delay or even concealment of intermediate innovation in a two-stage competition.
In the domain of R&D races with more than one stage, a number of theoretical studies have tried to depict firms' strategic interaction at an intermediate stage.
Grossman and Shapiro [11] and Harris and Vickers [12] firms always know exactly their rate of a success in each stage following participation/investment. The general conclusion drawn from this literature is that a success in intermediate stages is beneficial for both the inventor and its opponent through technology spillover that follows disclosure. De Fraja [9] comes to a similar assertion by modeling spillover as investment that will also benefit the opponent.
Our paper is closest to that of Choi [6] , which is the first to raise the issue of success rate uncertainty. Choi's model features a two-stage race where the success rate of the first stage is unknown, and the result argues similarly to the above that one firm's success in the early stage always benefits the opponent by signaling a low difficulty level. This proposition, nevertheless, stems from the assumption that no firm can hide its success, i.e. a firm automatically knows when its opponent has solved the first stage. In contrast, our model assumes that firms are free to choose whether or not to disclose their success, which leads to an entirely different prediction that, under uncertainty, possible technology spillover only occurs when either firm solves the first stage shortly after the competition begins. After a certain time threshold, no firm will disclose its intermediate success and spillover will cease thereafter.
A most recent development in this field is Bobtcheff et al. [5] . They also focus on two-player priority races where the solution to a valuable problem is privately observed and every player with the solution need to decide when to disclose her result. The longer a player waits, the larger the value of her solution becomes if she still preempts her opponent. As a result, players in their model behave in the opposite way to ours: they withhold the solution at the beginning, and only disclose it when it is "mature", i.e. the value has grown considerably after a sufficiently long time.
There is also a large literature in law and economics that analyzes partial 5 information disclosure in patent races, but with quite a different framework. In this line of research, a firm's does not strategically disclose information useful to its opponent to secure the immediate benefit as studied in our paper. Instead, possible incentives for information disclosure include signaling strength and commitment to the race [1, 10] , inducing exit of risk-averse competitors [3, 14, 2] or establishing prior art as a defensive measure [16] . λ may take one of two values: H > 0 or L = 0. In other words, a firm can either solve stage 1 with positive probability, or it can never succeed. The value of λ cannot be observed by either firm, but has to be learned over time. For simplicity, we assume that at t = 0, both firms hold an identical priorλ = α ∈ (0, 1). We will explain the firms' information update process in detail in the next subsection.
Once a firm solves stage 1, it can choose whether to disclose or to withhold its invention. When it discloses the solution, if its opponent has not succeeded yet, the firm claims all credit for the invention and receives a reward of p 1 > 0. However, if its opponent has also succeeded (but has chosen to withhold the success), the firms will ultimately receive 1 In principle, whether to file the lawsuit and obtain half of the reward is a choice, but here
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Once the solution of stage 1 is disclosed, technology spillover takes place: the product becomes available to both firms, and they then begin working on stage 2, the second and final product, with an i.i.d. Poisson rate of success µ. We assume that µ only takes one value and that the value is common knowledge, thereby allowing us to focus on uncertainty in stage 1 without considering insignificant technical details. However, if a firm chooses not to disclose the solution after solving stage 1, it can still work on stage 2 on its own. Whichever firm solves stage 2 first receives a reward of p 2 > 0.
Staying in the competition may be costly. We assume that during stage 1, each firm pays a cost per unit time c > 0, which can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of the resources needed to establish a new department, hire external experts, etc. On the other hand, the cost for the commercial stage is much lower than innovation, because it is part of the firm's regular business and does not require the reallocation of resources. Hence, we assume for convenience that the cost is zero for stage 2. Once stage 2 is solved, the game ends. A firm can choose to exit the competition at any time point before it ends; once a firm exits, it cannot re-enter the competition. Moreover, we assume that exit cannot be observed by the other firm.
Finally, we make the following three assumptions on the set of parameters {α, H, µ, p 1 , p 2 , c} throughout the paper. We will be more specific about the use of each assumption in the analysis section.
A1. αH(p 1 + p 2 ) > c. This assumption guarantees that at least at t = 0 each firm has a positive rate of net return.
This assumption makes it possible for disclosure to occur in equilibrium.
it must be the optimal action to take. Hence, without loss of generality, we assume that this process is automatic.
A3. The following inequality is satisfied:
This assumption allows for an equilibrium where disclosure is weakly optimal for each firm at t = 0 when α = 
Strategy, Information and Equilibrium
Before solving stage 1, it is clear that a firm is only free to choose when to exit.
After finishing the intermediate product, by our assumption above a firm never exits. It then conditions its decision of disclosing/withholding the solution on time elapsed. We assume that a firm uses Bayesian updating whenever possible.
In this paper we focus on symmetric strategies that are piecewise continuous.
That is, a strategy profile can be characterized by a number of cutoffs t 1 , t 2 ...t n in the following way: for an arbitrary i, each firm's action at time t is the same for every t ∈ (t i , t i+1 ). We call (t i , t i+1 ) a "disclose region" if the firm immediately discloses any incoming success in (t i , t i+1 ); we call (t i , t i+1 ) a "withhold region" if the firm withholds any incoming success in (t i , t i+1 ); and we call (t i , t i+1 ) an exit region if the firm exits.
The key difference made by this model is the existence of both uncertainty and the firms' strategic response to it. Firms do not directly observe λ, and is free to conceal their success in stage 1 to partly manipulate the opponent's belief. Formally, each firm holds a beliefλ regarding the difficulty of the project
A firm updates its belief through (1) its own progress (success or not) in stage 1 and (2) its opponent's disclosed success or silence. It is important to note here that the belief updating process of each firm is affected by its opponent's strategy.
2 Since we focus on the symmetric case, for notational convenience we choose not to use different labels here for the two firms' beliefs 8
To demonstrate how a firm's belief about λ evolves over time, we consider the following simple symmetric case: each firm discloses its success whenever it solve stage 1 by time t 1 , but withhold its success from t 1 to another time point t 2 , after which it exits the competition if it has not solved stage 1. As we will show in the result section, this is exactly how the firms will behave in the unique equilibrium.
We writeλ asλ(t), a function of time t. The trajectory ofλ(t) is simple in the disclose region (0, t ′ ). Absent a disclosure of success,λ(t) evolves as follows:
On the other hand, whenever either firm succeeds in this region, both firms' beliefs jump to 1 because the successful firm will disclose the solution immediately.
In the withhold region, the updating process is somewhat more complex, as silence does not explicitly suggest whether the opponent has solved stage 1 or not; instead, it implies that the opponent has not solved stage 2, thus implicitly undermining the likelihood of its success in stage 1. When t ∈ (t 1 , t 2 ), absent a disclosure of success,λ(t) evolves as follows:
Whenever a firm succeeds in this region, only its own belief jumps to 1 since it will keep the good news private.
Intuitively,λ(t) should be decreasing as waiting in vain for a success can only indicate that stage 1 is more and more likely to be unfeasible. This is confirmed by the following lemma.
Lemma 1.λ(t) always decreases in t.
Proof. For (1), observe that e −2Ht decreases in t; thus,λ(t) decreases in t.
For (2), when µ = H we have
The derivative of the right-hand side with respect to t is equal to
which is always negative. Hence, we can conclude that e −2Ht 1 −H(t−t 1 ) (e −H(t−t 1 ) + t−t 1 0
He
−sH e −(t−t 1 −s)µ ds) decreases in t and thusλ(t) decreases in t.
When µ = H, we have
which again decreases in t. Therefore,λ(t) decreases in t.
It is simple yet useful to understand the reasoning behind Lemma 1. In the disclose region, absent any disclosure, a firm's belief update is twofold. First, its unsuccessful research decreases its estimation of λ; second, the implied public information that its opponent has also not succeeded again decreases its estimation of λ. In the withhold region, although the firm no longer observes its opponent's progress, it knows at least that the opponent has not completed stage 2 (otherwise, the opponent will disclose everything and win the game) and thus is also less likely to have completed stage 1. All this information diminishes the likelihood that stage 1 can ever be solved, i.e.,λ(t) always decreases in t.
At the end of this section, we define the equilibrium of this game. Following the conventional characterization, an equilibrium is a (symmetric, piecewise continuous) strategy profile such that for each firm, at any time t ≥ 0, following the action specified in the strategy profile maximizes the firm's expected continuation payoff given the strategy of its opponent.
Results

Characterization of Unique Equilibrium
Our first main result is the explicit characterization of the unique equilibrium.
Noting the nature of sequential optimality in an equilibrium, our approach is to work backwards, i.e. we determine a firm's optimal action in the following order:
(1) when it has not solved stage 1 after spending a long time in the competition, (2) when it solves stage 1 only at a late time, and (3) when it solves stage 1 early.
We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 2. In every equilibrium, there existst such that a firm exits when t ∈ [t, ∞].
Proof. As t → ∞, absent success,λ(t) < αe −Ht αe −Ht +1−α → 0. Hence asλ(t) > 0, we haveλ(t) → 0. Then, we compare the firm's incentives for staying and exiting.
The incentive to stay an additional time increment dt is less thanλ(t)H(p 1 +p 2 )dt, which approaches o(dt) as t → ∞. By our assumption of a fixed c > 0, an exit point always exists.
The intuition for the existence of an exit region in every equilibrium is that no firm is willing to stay indefinitely in the competition when staying is costly and stage 1 may just be unsolvable. As time goes by with no good news arriving, a firm believes that λ = 0 is more and more likely and will ultimately decides to exit.
Recall that every strategy profile, and hence every candidate for an equilibrium, can be considered here can be characterized by a number of cutoffs t 1 , t 2 ...t n . Therefore (t n , ∞) must be the only exit region in every equilibrium.
Next, we go one step backwards to show that withholding the solution must be optimal when time gets close to the exit point.
Lemma 3. In every equilibrium, each firm must be withholding the solution in
Proof. Suppose, alternatively, that in some equilibrium both firms choose to disclose the solution at t n − dt. Consider either of the firms, say firm A, and suppose that the probability that the firm's opponent has succeeded in stage 1 before this time instant is p. The expected payoff from disclosure is p 1 (1 − p) + Proof. By Lemma 3, there must be at least one withhold region. Suppose that there is a series of withhold regions, (t 1 , t 2 ), (t 3 , t 4 ), ...,(t 2m−1 , t 2m ), m ∈ N + .
Without loss of generality, we analyze the firm's incentives at t 1 .
The payoff from disclosure is
, which is a constant. The expected payoff from withholding the solution from t 1 to t 2 is
At cutoff t 1 , the firm should be at least indifferent between disclosing and withholding the solution:
which contradicts our assumption p 1 H > p 2 µ.
Our approach for the proof here is to assume multiple withhold regions in an equilibrium and evaluate the incentives for different actions at the instant of entering the first such region. We show that the condition needed for starting the withhold region now contradicts the very assumption that guarantees the existence of a disclose region. Therefore, the withhold region in every equilibrium is unique and withholding the solution must be followed by exit.
Now we are ready to present our main theorem. 
Proof. See Appendix A.
This result highlights our distinction with previous literature, that the positive externalities from technology spillover may never realize because firms change their behavior according to time and belief. Whenever a firm solves stage 1, it immediately realizes that stage 1 is solvable, but its decision of whether to disclose the solution depends on when this jump of belief takes place. If it succeeds early in the competition, there is still a long time before the opponent quits; given that stage 1 is solvable, the opponent may just also solve stage 1 before the exit point.
Hence the rational choice to make is to disclose the solution at once so that p 1 is secured. Here technology spillover will occur and the overall progress of R&D is indeed accelerated (as compared to, for instance, the case where the two firms work independently on the project without any technology spillover).
However, when no firm has solved stage 1 before the time threshold t 1 , the incentives for disclosing and withholding the solution change drastically. Now 13 that not much time remains before the exit point, it becomes unlikely that the opponent can succeed in stage 1 if it has not already. Hence, the benefit of disclosure has not increased -in fact, it has decreased since the opponent may have solved stage 1 some time between t 1 and now -but there is a larger cost now because disclosure could save the opponent from quitting and simply cut the expected payoff from the next stage by half. As a result, both firms would rather conceal any success and wait for the opponent to quit. Technology spillover will never happen in this time region and a competition is no different from pursuing R&D independently.
Welfare Analysis
In this section we analyze the effect of uncertainty on social welfare. In particular,
we are interested in whether the conventional wisdom that competition always facilitates efficiency still holds here: under uncertainty, is a two-firm competition always socially preferred to a one-firm monopoly? To provide a tractable answer, we assume that the final outcome is indispensable to the society, meaning that, from a social welfare perspective, a success is always desirable, while the associated cost is relatively trivial. Thus, social welfare can be measured by the probability that the game ends in solving stage 1 (by at least one firm) rather than in all firms exiting. This notion is consistent with the social welfare analysis in a wide range of literature in economics and law which studies innovation and patent races (see for example [3] [16]).
The above probability has a one-to-one relationship with the total length of time elapsed per firm before all firms exit. In the case of multiple firms, this time length is the sum of individual time lengths. Hence, our approach here is to calculate it in an R&D process without competition (a single firm), and one with competition (two firms) respectively.
When there is only one firm, information is perfect: the firm always knows whether or not it has solved stage 1. With two competing firms, however, information is imperfect in the sense that no firm knows whether its opponent has 14 solved stage 1 once they enter the withhold region. In general, the imperfect information has two effects: . From this aspect, a firm is less willing to stay in the competition. From this aspect, a firm is more willing to stay in the competition.
When the first effect is larger than (equal to, smaller than) the second, competition shortens (does not change, extends) the total time spent on R&D without solving stage 1 and hence decreases (does not change, increases) social welfare.
The formal statement is as follows. the society prefers a two-firm competition if
Proof. See Appendix B.
Besides comparing the total time on R&D in the two schemes as in our formal proof, we can also derive the result from the following condition: and the original value of the fraction, c.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. When c is high, a firm in a competition exits sooner, i.e., it's beliefλ(t) is still relatively high when exiting.
Thus, by the end of the withhold region, as time passes by, the firm is not yet so concerned about the possibility that the task is impossible (Effect 2); rather, it is scared away as its opponent is increasingly likely to have finished the first stage (Effect 1). As Effect 1 plays the decisive role, two firms in a competition are less persistent than in a monopoly.
On the other hand, when c is low, a firm exits later when it's beliefλ(t) is relatively low. Thus, by the end of the withhold region, the firm is less worried that its opponent may have solved stage 1, but is more concerned that stage 1 may not be solvable after all. In contrast to the above situation, Effect 1 is now very small and Effect 2 dominates. As we have discussed,λ(t) evolves more slowly due to imperfect information, and hence two firms in a competition are more persistent than in a monopoly.
Numerical Example
We assume that the arrival rate of a success is H = 1, L = 0 for the first stage From the society's perspective, a monopoly is preferred.
For comparison purpose, if we lower c to 0.2, i.e. smaller than
, the cutoffs become t 1 = 1.346 and t 2 = 1.537; in the two-firm competition, the total time spent on research without solving stage 1 is 3.074. However in such a case a monopolist shall exit at t = 2.996. From the society's perspective, a competition is preferred.
Discussion
In scenarios where the final output is not indispensable, the implication of our model varies. Suppose that the society values the final output at p, p > p 1 + p 2 . is highly valuable to the society and welfare can be measured by the probability of completing the whole project, we show that a competition is not always the desired scheme: the society may benefit from assigning the project to one single firm.
We believe that this paper may open the way for richer studies on R&D competitions with uncertainty and related policy issues. One natural extension of the model is to solve the game with a larger number of firms and/or firms of different research capacity and cost. Also, there may be more than one research path to reach the final stage, and it is interesting to explore how competing firms choose to experiment and learn about distinct paths. He −Hs e −(t−t 1 −s)µ ds .
Next we show that the RHS of (3) 
